Belarus: Will it Last?

by Brady Condon

Russia until now

The end of the Cold War was disastrous for the Russian state. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Soviet Russia was shielded from a possible war with the United States through a wall of Communist puppet states, united by the Warsaw Pact. Now that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have dissolved, the Russian bear is threatened by the expanding trap of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is under 100 miles from St. Petersburg, and 300 miles from Moscow. This development has thrown Russia on the defensive, struggling to maintain its status as a relevant power. The collapse of the Soviet Union remains relevant to those who hold power in the country, especially President Vladimir Putin. With the collapse of the Soviet Union weighing heavily on the Russian national conscience, it is no wonder that President Putin would like to restore what he can of its former glory through aggressive expansionism.

How Russia responds

The greatest threat to Russian expansion is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The initial purpose of the creation of NATO was to contain the spread of Soviet communism throughout Europe. Over the course of NATO’s history, the alliance has expanded from 12 to 29 member states, many of which are former Russian satellites. Russia’s biggest concern now is to avoid complete encirclement from NATO and its allies, which causes the country to take action in many of its bordering states. When NATO tries to expand, Russia can be found counter-expanding to curb NATO’s influence from spreading further.

Two notable examples of Russian expansionism to limit NATO’s power can be seen in the bordering states of Georgia and Ukraine, where Russia sows instability within the ruling government through separatist movements calling for unity with Russia and carves out chunks of land to claim for itself. These two countries have two things in common: firstly, they both emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Secondly, both have tried to join NATO. Putin has expressed interest in preventing these states from joining the anti-Russian alliance.

How countries (try to) escape Russian influence

There are three camps of smaller countries on Russia’s borders: first, there are those who joined NATO while Russia was too weak to do anything, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Secondly, there are those states that are warming up to NATO but suffer from massive instability caused by Russia. Finally, there are those countries who try to carve out what little autonomy they can without poking the Russian bear. One country that finds itself in the last category is Belarus, a poor, landlocked country between Poland and Russia.

Belarus has a surprisingly warm relationship with the Russians, with Belarus literally meaning “White Russia.” Russia also has taken large part in keeping Belarus as an exploitable source of wealth. One such resource is discounted oil, which has saved the Belorussian people a purported $100 billion, almost twice their entire GDP. A simple way to look at Belorussian dependence on Russia is through trade. Belarus conducts 48.5% of all trade with Russia, more than twice as much as with their next largest trade partner.

The relationship between these two countries has benefited many Belorussians, but none have benefited more than Belorussian president, Aleksandr Lukashenko. As “Europe’s last dictator,” Lukashenko needs friends with political clout to maintain his power base. Fortunately for him, he needs to look no further than President Putin. By maintaining an alliance with Putin, Lukashenko’s country is one of the few in the region with no hard influence from NATO. This has allowed Lukashenko to run his country mostly as he pleases; as long as he demonstrates loyalty to the Kremlin, he and his country are able to remain mostly autonomous.

When a Belorussian fails to kowtow

Much to Putin’s ire, Lukashenko sometimes fails to provide support when the Russian state needs it the most. Many of these situations happen when Russia meddles in former Soviet states. In Ukraine, Lukashenko referred to the annexation of Crimea as “bad precedent.” As Belarus fails to act on the exact will of Putin, the Russian president begins to question the use of an independent Belarus, when it would be just as useful as a province in the Russian State. Since the country is so dependent on Russia, the relationship has soured, becoming more of a nuisance to Putin than anything. Putin, however, has a solution in mind.

Union: a dirty word

In the 1990s, Russia and Belarus signed several treaties bringing them towards a nearly united state. These treaties are what allow Belarus to be treated well by the Russian economy. Over time though, these old treaties began to backfire. Vladimir Putin has more than to gain from a union with Belarus than the elimination of a distraction.

Despite his aptitude at weaving his way around the branches of power in Russia to maintain power for two decades, the Russian constitution states that Putin’s term will end in 2024. While changing the constitution would be relatively easy, Putin worries about the optics of doing so; maintaining the facade of democracy is necessary to avoid being confrontation on the international platform. Belarus could be his way around this problem. Upon the unification of the two nations, Putin would be able to become president of a new confederation comprised of Russia and Belarus, allowing himself to stay in power for as long as he pleases.

On the other hand, the Belorussian people do not benefit from such a union. The entire country of Belarus has a smaller population than the city of Moscow, so even in a real democratic system, they would suffer from less representation, and eventually, assimilation.

Surprisingly, the largest threat to such a union are the Russian people. A recent state-funded poll found that 48 percent of respondents believe that unification is not necessary. The Russian people are largely disinterested in the burden that Belarus’s developing GDP (only about a fourth of the GDP of Moscow alone) will put on Russia’s economy. Putin may not listen to the people; his record suggests that he will force legislation through. However, it is interesting to see the difference in opinion between the government and the people of Russia. Even with this disparity, however, true resistance is weak, meaning that when Russia decides to “unite” with Belarus, both the Belorussian and the Russian people will not have much say in the matter.

More Readings:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/28/will-russia-try-occupy-belarus/?utm_term=.790eb115772e ->

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-01-08/putin-is-seeking-to-retain-power-through-a-union-with-belarus

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-26/russia-considers-constitution-changes-as-putin-faces-term-limits